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ABSTRACT

The reunification of East and West Germany on October 3,
1990 marked a radical change in Soviet foreign policy toward
Germany and Europe. The German Democratic Republic had been
Moscow's most important point of leverage against the West and
had provided ideological support for Soviet control of Eastern
Europe. Yet the Soviets permitted the merging of the GDR into
the FRG, which meant that the new Germany remained a part of
NATO.
Various explanations for this extreme change in foreign
policy emphasize the role of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev
in formulating Moscow's new policies.
These explanations,
however, focus too narrowly on Soviet policy during the late
1980s. A true understanding of the strategic shift must take
into account the historical context of the changes.
The forty years preceding Gorbachev had witnessed Soviet
strategies
that
alternated
between
confrontation
and
cooperation with the West in order to achieve postwar
objectives.
Neither approach had proven successful. These
years had so limited the options of Soviet strategy that when
Gorbachev took office in 1985 he had few viable choices left
regarding Germany and Europe.
The 1989 uprisings in Eastern Europe renewed speculation
about German reunification.
Gorbachev was faced with two
choices concerning East Germany: to intervene militarily or
to allow events to continue.
Intervention threatened the
Soviets with military confrontation with NATO and political
and economic isolation, as the previous forty years had
demonstrated. Realizing this, Gorbachev took the only viable
option; he consented to a united Germany that would remain in
NATO.
V
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AT THE CORE OF THE COLD WAR:
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND THE GERMAN QUESTION
1945 - 1990

INTRODUCTION

On October 3, 1990 the German Democratic Republic merged
into the Federal Republic of Germany,
division of Germany.

ending the postwar

The reunited country remained within

NATO and did so with the acquiescence of the Soviet Union.
This event marked a radical change in Soviet objectives
for Western Europe in general and Germany in particular.
Because of the unique relationship between East and West
Germany, the GDR had been the Soviet Union’s point of contact
with Western Europe, both for importing Western goods and
technology and for exerting political and military pressure on
the Western alliance.

Far more important was the strategic

significance of this reversal.
Moscow relinquished the most

In yielding East Germany,
important point of leverage

against the West that it had gained from World War II.
Why would Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, a committed
leader of the Communist Party and President of the Soviet
Union, make such a one-sided concession to the West?
explanation

One

is that Gorbachev and his government pursued

foreign and domestic policy incompetently— their reactions to
the changing world situation in the late 1980s were simply a
series of mistakes.

A former People's Deputy of the USSR,

explaining in April 1990 why he had resigned at the previous
2

3

CPSU Congress, stated his frustration with the Soviet leader:
Mikhail Sergeyevich is a strong politician, of course.
But either he is not managing to get to grips with
everything or he has lost his way and does not have the
courage to admit this even to himself.1
Another explanation is that the Soviets actively sought
change in Eastern Europe and in the traditional balance of
power.

Moscow offered to relinquish control of Eastern Europe

and show Western Europe a more friendly, cooperative Soviet
Union.
The prize for the West Europeans, and especially the
Germans, is the re-fusion of Europe along the Elbe River,
but the price is no less evident:
deference toward
Soviet sensitivities.
If Gorbachev and his successors
can pull this off, the rewards will be handsome: maximal
Soviet influence in all of Europe, which will more than
compensate for the loss of Moscow's East European
fiefdoms.2
Gorbachev was the brilliant diplomatic strategist whose gamble
failed:

the Soviet Union surrendered Eastern Europe, but

Western Europe remained firmly linked to the United States.
A third explanation

is that Gorbachev,

while making

apparently sound tactical foreign policy decisions, unleashed
more than he could control.

For example, when Gorbachev

decided to quit supporting East Germany's Erich Honecker, he
expected a reformed communist state to remain.

The torrent of

lHGorbachev May Have Lost His Way," in Pravda (28 April
1990): 4, quoted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service—
Soviet Union (3 May 1990): 42.
2Josef Joffe, "The 'Revisionists': Germany and Russia in
a Post-Bipolar World," in New Thinking and Old Realities:
America. Europe and Russia, ed. Michael T. Clark and Simon
Serfaty (Washington: Seven Locks Press, 1991), 110.
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reunification fervor that followed Honecker's resignation and
the opening of the Brandenburg Gate caught the Kremlin leader
off guard.3

The current disintegration of the Soviet Union

is another example of Gorbachev's tactical brilliance and
strategic short-sightedness.

In decentralizing the decision

making authority in the USSR, Gorbachev sought to insure its
cohesion, not to initiate numerous independence movements.
Each of these explanations, however, focuses too narrowly
on Gorbachev and his position.

A true understanding of Soviet

acquiescence to German reunification in NATO must examine the
historical context of Soviet strategy during the Cold War.
Forty years of Soviet foreign policy preceded Gorbachev.
These years had so limited the options of Soviet strategy that
when Gorbachev took office in 1985 he had few viable options
regarding Germany and Europe.

Indeed, when the uprisings in

Eastern Europe began in 1989, the Soviet leader had but two
choices:

to intervene militarily, risking conflict with NATO

and international isolation abroad and economic collapse at
home, or to allow the course of events to continue.

Soviet

postwar history had revealed that the first choice was not
feasible and that only the second choice held any prospect for
the survival of the Soviet state.
In order to understand how profound the shift in Soviet
policy toward Germany was, the significance of Western Europe

3Angela Stent, "The One Germany," Foreign Policy, no. 81
(Winter 1990-91): 59.
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and Germany to the Soviet Union must be considered.

Western

Europe was the most important area of the Cold War.

It had a

more developed infrastructure, technology and industrial base
than the Soviet Union.

It provided a center of attraction for

Eastern Europe because of its superior cultural and economic
development.

Western Europe was also the route for American

influence in world affairs.4 In addition to a common cultural
background and a similar economic system, the United States
and its Western European allies shared a strategic interest in
containing Soviet influence both in Europe and in the Third
World.

The US presence in Europe, especially through NATO and

its nuclear capability, proved particularly vexing to the
Soviets because

it negated their military and geographic

advantages.5
After World War II, the Soviet Union had three objectives
concerning Europe.

The first was to secure the territorial

and political gains it had purchased at high cost during the
war.

This

included the Soviet desire to gain worldwide

recognition of its status as a new superpower,

with the

political clout that accompanied that status, and recognition
of the legitimacy of the Soviet Union's and Eastern Europe's
postwar borders.
4Hannes Adomeit, "Soviet Policy Toward the West: Costs
and Benefits of Using 'Imperialist Contradictions'," in The
Soviet Problem in American-German Relations, ed. Uwe Nehrlich
and James A. Thomson (New York:
Crane, Russak & Company,
Inc., 1985), 197.
5Joffe, 99.
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The second objective was to establish Eastern Europe as
a buffer zone against further European hostilities.

Having

been twice invaded in the twentieth century by Germany, the
Soviets wished to form a protective barrier of docile client
states in Eastern Europe.

This would have the dual advantage

of insulating Soviet territory from invasion and allowing the
Soviet conventional forces easier access to

(and leverage

against) Western Europe.
The third objective was to avoid strategic isolation and
maintain Soviet

influence in European and world affairs.

Reducing the American presence in Europe was crucial to this
goal, since the US provided the strength of the alliance that
sought to contain Soviet influence on the continent.
Germany occupied a unique position in each of these
objectives.

Its geographic location and economic potential

made it especially significant in Soviet foreign policy.6 Its
position in the center of Europe made Germany the natural
gateway between East and West; for the Soviets, this gateway
provided access to the more developed Western states, both for
acquiring goods and exerting influence.

The postwar division

of Germany contained the German military threat.

The presence

of a strongly communist East Germany provided ideological
support for Soviet control of Eastern Europe.7 The GDR also
6Ibid., 97.
7Michael J. Sodaro, Moscow. Germany and the West from
Khrushchev to Gorbachev (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University
Press, 1990), 392.
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gave Moscow the opportunity to station Soviet forces in the
heart of Europe.
The

Federal

Republic

represented

both

threat

and

opportunity to Moscow.8 West Germany was the easternmost arm
of NATO and therefore the most important state in the forwardbased defense system of the West.

With the withdrawal of

France from NATO in 1966, the FRG provided the most important
military bases, geostrategic location and industrial and human
potential for maintaining an effective NATO presence on the
continent.9

Potential reunification offered a threat to the

cohesion of the Eastern bloc; yet the Soviets were willing in
the 1950s to accept reunification in exchange for German
neutrality.

The Soviets even offered reunification in an

attempt to prevent West German entry into NATO.

A neutral

Germany would have left an unattached industrial giant in the
center of Europe,

but such a state would have been more

susceptible to Soviet manipulation than one entrenched in the
Western bloc.

Furthermore, the loss of the FRG would have

undermined NATO's ability to contain the Soviet Union.
Even attached to the West, the Federal Republic offered
the Soviets access to Western goods and technology.

Although

there were voices in the Eastern bloc, most notably that of

8Angela Stent, From Embargo to Ostoolitik: The Political
Economy of West German-Soviet Relations. 1955-1980 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1981), 79.
9Gerhard Wettig, "The German Problem in Soviet Policy,"
Aussenoolitik 41, no. 1 (1990): 39.
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East Germany*s Communist Party leader, Walter Ulbricht, that
warned of the political implications of economic dependence on
the West,

the Soviets cultivated trade with West Germany

during the postwar period.
Thus
Germany.

the

Soviets

had

three

objectives

specific

to

The first was to insure that Germany would never

again be a military threat to the Soviet Union.

The second

was to insure that the FRG would not be a political threat to
the Soviets— to prevent West Germany

from undermining or

weakening the Soviet control of Eastern Europe.

Finally, the

Soviets wished to decouple the FRG from the Western alliance
in order to isolate or neutralize Germany and weaken NATO.
Critical to any explanation of Soviet postwar policy is
understanding the Soviet concept of security.

Until recently,

the Soviets have defined security in terms of defense rather
than deterrence.

The Soviets believed they had to maintain

regional (i.e., European) military superiority not to prevent
a war, but in order to survive and win one.10
the Soviet desire for a nuclear-free Europe.
American tactical

nuclear weapons

This explains

The presence of

in Europe deprived the

Soviets of regional superiority, since the destructiveness of
these weapons greatly reduced the ability of Soviet forces to

10Gerhard Wettig, "Germany, Europe and the Soviets," in
Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe:
Implications for the
Atlantic Alliance, ed. Herbert J. Ellison (Seattle, WA:
University of Washington Press, 1983), 36.

9

survive and win a war in which such weapons were used.11

In

presenting their demands for a non-nuclear Europe, the Soviets
argued that the United States could threaten the Soviet Union
with

both theater weapons

and

intercontinental

missiles,

whereas the Soviet could threaten only with the latter.
In the Soviet view, the intended capability to deprive
the United States of its European and other military
bridgeheads along the periphery of the USSR is an
essential requirement of "equal security”: the United
States is not to have its military foot near the Soviet
borders as long as the Soviet Union has no similar
military strongholds on the American continent.12
The

FRG1s position at the eastern edge of NATO made

especially significant with respect to theater forces.

it

From

German soil, theater nuclear weapons could reach the Soviet
heartland.
From the Western viewpoint, theater weapons had value as
a deterrent not only against large scale Soviet aggression but
also against limited warfare.

They insured that the Soviet

Union could not wage even limited war
threatening its own territory.13
not lost on the Soviets.

in Europe without

This viewpoint was surely

It would be incorrect, however, to

assume that the USSR believed it was pursuing an aggressive
military policy during the Cold War.
Soviet military planning should rather be seen as ever
11Gerhard Wettig, "Deterrence, Missiles and NATO in Soviet
Foreign Policy." Aussenoolitik 36, no. 4 (1989): 322-23.
12Wettig, "Germany, Europe and the Soviets," 37.
13Gerhard Wettig, "The Soviet Union and Arms Control,"
Aussenoolitik 36, no. 1 (1985): 27.
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more desperate attempts to give the Soviet Union the
capacity
to
survive
in
a
"world war"
against
technologically superior states.14
Also critical to explaining Soviet foreign policy is the
concept of the "correlation of forces." This "correlation" is
not merely an assessment of the balance of military power.
Traditional

Soviet

doctrine

sought

to

interpret

the

international situation according to the military, economic
political, social and ideological relationships prevailing at
any given moment between peoples and states.15

Throughout

much of the postwar period, the Soviets believed that the
global

"correlation of

socialism.

forces"

was

changing

in favor of

One way of exploiting the change was to play up

differences of opinion among the Western powers to Soviet
advantage. Arms control negotiations were particularly suited
to exploitation of "contradictions," since the "diversity of
national situations" created tension within NATO's ranks.16
In the late 1970s, for example, the Soviets sought to arouse
popular opinion in the West against the Western governments
over the proposed NATO deployment of Pershing II and cruise

14David Habakkuk, "Frightened with False Fire?
The
Alliance in Light of the Recession of Soviet Power," Political
Quarterly 61 (July-September 1990): 258-59.
15For a more detailed discussion of the "correlation of
forces," see Allen Lynch, The Soviet Study of International
Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 89103.
16John Van Oudenaren, Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe:
Objectives. Instruments. Results (Santa Monica, CA:
Rand,
1986), 51.
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missiles.
A corollary to the belief in the "correlation of forces"
is

the

pragmatic

Soviet

commitment

formulating foreign policy.

to

flexibility

in

The Soviets did not "design

strategic master plans in advance."17 Instead, they tried to
keep their options open (for example, by alternating between
cooperation and confrontation with the West) , even if this led
to short-term policy contradictions.
intercontinental
States

missiles

directly,

the

that

could

Soviet

Union

Even after developing
threaten the United
maintained

massive

conventional and nuclear forces in the European theater.
Finally, it is important to note the asymmetry of Soviet
efforts in military and economic development.

In its attempts

to use its military and geostrategic advantages to extort
economic gains from the West,
establish

economic

security,

the Soviet Union failed to
thus

giving

credence

to

Ulbricht's warning about economic dependency on the West.18
Moscow became too dependent on economic relations with the
West and failed to promote internal

reform.

The Soviet

neglect of the economic foundations of security would prove
extremely costly at each acceleration of the arms

race.

Maintaining the massive forces in Europe, competing with the
United States in the arms buildup, subsidizing client state

17Wettig, "Germany, Europe and the Soviets," 41.
18Vladimir Rubanov, "Defence Gets the Best, Economy the
Rest," International Affairs (Moscow), (January 1991): 6.
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economies and intervening in the Third World would become too
great a cost for a stagnant economy to bear.
At the end of the 1980s, Gorbachev would have little
choice

but

to

relinquish

Soviet

control

of

its

empire.

Nowhere would this be more evident than with the merging of
East Germany into its Western counterpart.
Germany had been the perennial graveyard of Soviet hopes
ever since the Bolsheviks had banked on the victory of a
proletarian revolution there in 1918. No other country
had been so crucial to Moscow as the indicator of
capitalism's future, and no one had given rise to so many
Soviet miscalculations.19

19Vojtech Mastny, "Stalin and the Militarization of the
Cold War," International Security 9 (Winter 1984-85): 119.

I
PROVOKING THE WEST, 1945 TO 1955

The failure of the victorious World War I powers to
secure a lasting peace in Europe was not forgotten by their
World War II counterparts in the final years of that war.

At

a Moscow conference in 1943, the Allied foreign ministers
believed that the Allies had made a vital mistake in 1918 when
they sought peace with Germany without having completely
defeated and occupied the country.

Roosevelt, Churchill and

Stalin were determined not to repeat this error.20
The Soviet leader was especially adamant on this point.
His reasons were understandable.

Of all the Allied nations,

the Soviet Union had suffered the greatest destruction and
heaviest losses.

Consequently, Soviet demands at the 1945

Yalta Conference for German reparations were considerably more
severe than those of Britain or the United States; the Soviets
wanted industrial equipment and labor from the German people
in addition to money.21

20Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and
Statecraft:
Diplomatic Problems of Our Time (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1990), 102.
zlHerbert Feis, Churchill. Roosevelt. Stalin:
The War
They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1957), 534-35.
13
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Yet Stalin was aware that fear of Soviet occupation and
harsher Soviet terms of surrender might cause the Germans to
surrender to the West alone.

A separate peace might leave the

Soviet Union out of any settlement of Germany, thus ending
Soviet hopes for reparations and denying them the opportunity
to

form part of the occupational

country.

forces

in the defeated

To discourage any one-sided capitulation, Stalin

insisted that the possible dismemberment of Germany be listed
among the stated Allied terms of surrender, knowing that the
Germans

would

not

want

their

country

divided.22

The

strategic reason behind the severe Soviet reparations was to
eliminate the German capacity to wage war, thus insuring that
Germany would not threaten the USSR again.
Stalinfs insistence on the dismemberment clause displays
the Soviet desire not to lose out on the spoils of the War.
Any rapport between victor and vanquished that excluded the
Soviet Union would allow the West to establish the postwar
order in Europe and deny Moscow any significant influence in
the process.
The

American

use

of

the

atomic

bomb

also

seemed

calculated to limit Soviet influence in shaping the postwar
order.

The

undermined the

sheer

destructive

Soviet advantage

capability

of

in conventional

the

bomb

forces.23

22Vojtech Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1979), 242.
23Ibid. , 303.
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Whereas the United States considered its nuclear monopoly to
be a deterrent to Soviet aggression, the Soviets believed that
it provided the American leadership with the means to limit
Moscow*s gains from the War.

Moscow's buildup of conventional

weapons and troops acquired two new purposes in addition to
insuring German docility and establishing control over Eastern
Europe.

The first was to provide leverage against the US

nuclear superiority by holding Europe "hostage."

The second

was to allow the Soviets time to catch up with and cancel the
American nuclear advantage.24
In the late 1940s the military buildup in Europe marked
the first use of the Soviet confrontational strategy.

By

exploiting its conventional military advantages, Moscow hoped
to gain leverage against its new opponent, the United States.
The confrontational approach, however, had consequences that
conflicted with Soviet interests.

Maintaining large amounts

of weapons and troops in Europe alarmed the West and prompted
a continued US

involvement

in Europe to halt the Soviet

domination of the continent.25
nuclear monopoly

and

fearful

Conscious of the American
of American

hostility,

the

Soviets believed they could deter an attack by the United
States only by making credible the Soviet threat of invading

24Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet power and Europe. 1945-1970
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 32-34.
25Mastny, "Stalin and the Militarization of the Cold War,"
111.
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and occupying Europe.26 Rather than assuring Soviet security
and Soviet influence in shaping Europe, however, Moscowfs
military posture provoked a defensive reaction from the West
that would culminate in the formation of NATO in 1949.
The Berlin Blockade of 1948 marked the peak of the
confrontational

strategy

in this period.

leverage through which the Soviets,

Berlin offered

by force,

planned to

prevent the integration of West Germany within the Western
alliance.27

The Blockade produced the opposite effect.

pushed West Germany
aggravated

Soviet

further toward the West.28
anxiety

about

the

American

It

It also
nuclear

superiority, as President Truman authorized "the use of atomic
weapons in case of war."29
Confrontation had therefore failed to distance Germany
from the West and had galvanized Western desires to contain
the Soviet threat.

Having found this approach unproductive,

Stalin turned to a more cooperative strategy.

His search for

peaceful relations with the West in 1949 and 1950 attempted
two things:

to undermine Western unity against the Soviet

Union and to gain time to secure Eastern Europe and to
26Wolfe, 34.
27Jof fe, 100.
28Edwina Moreton, "The German Factor," in Soviet Strategy
Toward Western Europe. ed. Edwina Moreton and Gerald Segal
(Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 116.
29Mastny, "Stalin and the Militarization of the Cold War,"
121, citing The Forrestal Diaries. ed. Walter Millis (New
York: Viking, 1951), 487.
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overcome

Soviet technological

inferiority.30

During this

period Moscow sought to exploit anti-war and anti-nuclear
feelings

in the West.

interests

in

settling differences with

negotiations.
weaken

in

The Soviets also expressed their
the West

through

Stalin hoped that the Western alliance would

the

absence

of

an

immediate

enemy;

a

peace

initiative might also deprive Western governments of support
by exploiting anti-war sentiment.
With respect to the United States,

however,

Stalin's

attempt at coexistence was undermined by the start of the
Korean War in 1950.31

Yet this cooperative phase of Soviet

foreign policy did not end here.

Still hoping to prevent West

German entry into NATO, the Soviet Union sent a note in March
1952 to the governments of the United States, Great Britain
and France.

The note outlined the Soviet offer for the

reunification of Germany,

provided the new Germany would

remain unattached to any military alliances.

The offer was

promoted by the Soviets with some modifications as late as
1954, during Khrushchev's tenure.
Also in late 1954 and early 1955, the Soviets suggested
several

proposals

for

security

in

Europe,

each

alternative to West German integration into NATO.
included

a

collective

security

system

of

East

as

an

These

and West

European states that excluded the United States, and a plan to
30Wolfe, 25.
31Ibid., 26.
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extend NATO so that it included the Soviet Union and some East
European countries.32
Nevertheless,
NATO.

in May 1955 the Federal Republic joined

The Soviet military buildup following World War II had

brought the Western states together to contain the perceived
Soviet threat.

Stalin had provoked this reaction, and his

later overtures of peace had been unable to reverse the
process.

The Soviet Union now confronted a Federal Republic

that formed the eastern arm of a rival military bloc and would
soon house theater nuclear weapons capable of striking Soviet
cities.

32Ibid. , 74-76.

II
THE POLARIZATION OF EUROPE, 1955 TO 1961

The

Federal

Republic's

entry

into

uncertain time for the Soviet government.

NATO

came

at

an

Stalin, the man who

had led the country to victory in World War II, had died two
years earlier, leaving what Khrushchev would later call "a
legacy of anxiety and fear."33

Stalin had left no appointed

successor, and Moscow was still painfully aware of the threat
of US nuclear superiority.
discussed

placing

the

In the early 1950s the Soviets had

military

forces

countries together under joint command.34

of

the

socialist

This happened ten

days after West Germany joined the Western alliance; a mutual
defense pact was signed in Warsaw by the Soviet Union and the
Eastern European states.
As
Stalin's

Stalin's eventual
policy

of

successor,

holding

Europe

Khrushchev continued
hostage

with

massive

conventional forces, even after the Soviet Union acquired the
capacity to threaten the US territory with nuclear weapons.
Although this policy did little to distance the United States
33Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament. trans. and
ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974),
193.
34Ibid. , 194.
19
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from

Europe,

Maintaining
European

it had
forces

several

in

aggression

advantages

Europe

provided

independent

of

in

Soviet

security

America;

it

eyes.

against
provided

leverage against the US in case the Soviets were unable to
reach strategic superiority over America; it also sustained
the Soviet military advantage around Berlin.35
Berlin was to become once more the focus of Soviet
pressure against the Western alliance.

Khrushchev's objective

was to avoid war but to expand Soviet influence in Europe and
the world.

The growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities relative

to those of the United States encouraged a more assertive
approach to foreign policy than Stalin could have enjoyed.
Sputnik's

launch

in

October

1957

demonstrated

Moscow's

superiority in rocket technology; it now appeared that the
Soviet Union was capable of delivering warheads to American
cities.

Whereas Stalin had initiated the Berlin Blockade for

defensive purposes (to prevent the FRG's entry into NATO),
Khrushchev initiated the Second Berlin Crisis to demonstrate
a rise of Soviet power relative to that of the United States—
a

shift

in

the

"correlation

of

forces"

in

favor

of

socialism.36
Khrushchev also had more immediate objectives in mind.
One aim was to force the Western Allies out of Berlin, thus
35Wolfe, 154-55.
36James L. Richardson, Germany and the Atlantic Alliance:
The Interaction of Strategy and Politics (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1966), 304.
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undermining NATO by proving the US commitment to the city
unreliable in the face of Soviet demands.37 In November 1958
the

Soviet Union gave the West

a six-month deadline

surrender the rights to West Berlin.

to

If the Western forces,

especially the United States, acquiesced to this demand, West
German faith in the ability of its alliance partners to resist
Soviet challenges would be shaken.

The Federal Republic would

therefore have less confidence in other Western commitments,
including that of the American nuclear deterrent against
Soviet attack.
Another purpose was to force recognition of the GDR by
the world, especially by the West.38

The Federal Republic

and its Western partners had refused to recognize the legal
existence

of

two

German

states.

For West

Germany,

to

recognize the German Democratic Republic meant to acknowledge
the

division

of

Germany

and

reunification in the near future.

virtually

end

hopes

of

For the United States,

recognizing East Germany would eliminate any influence America
had in that region as one of the four powers privy to a final
settlement of the German question.
When Khrushchev issued his demand for the withdrawal of
Western forces from West Berlin, he threatened to sign a peace
37Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and
Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago:
The University of Chicago
Press, 1966), 117.
38Clay Clemens, Reluctant Realists:____ The Christian
Democrats and West German Ostpolitik (Durham, NC:
Duke
University Press, 1989), 39-40.
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treaty with the GDR without the involvement of the other
Allied states.

This peace treaty would have given the East

Germans the right to operate as a sovereign state without
Soviet control.

The East Germans might then deny access to

Berlin, thus forcing the West to deal with the GDR as a legal
entity. If the West should attempt to regain access to the
city by force,
Union.

it would risk hostilities with the Soviet

By exaggerating its missile capacity, Moscow could

imply a shift in the balance of strategic power and thus
substantiate its threat of war.39
The American reaction to Moscow's demand was to refuse to
negotiate the Berlin issue under an ultimatum.

The deadline

was dropped, and in July and August 1959 the two sides met in
Geneva, where no progress was made on the issue.

During the

negotiations, however, Khrushchev temporarily abandoned the
confrontational approach to Berlin and accepted an invitation
from President Eisenhower to visit the United States.
Khrushchev's enthusiasm in accepting the invitation arose
partly from his belief that the Soviets had "finally forced
the United States to recognize the necessity of establishing
closer

contacts

with

[the

Soviet

Union]."40

His

visit

demonstrated his willingness to adopt a cooperative approach
to solving the Berlin issue.

Yet the deteriorating relations

39Horelick and Rush, 120.
A0Khrushchev Remembers. 374.
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between the Soviet Union and China provided another motive.41
Ideological tensions between the two had started when China
announced

the

"Great

Leap

Forward"

in

May

1958,

which

announced Chinese intentions to deviate from the Soviet model
of Communism.

In June 1959 the Soviets abruptly terminated an

agreement to provide military (including nuclear) technology
to China.

As relations between Moscow and Beijing soured,

Khrushchev showed a willingness to be more flexible in dealing
with the United States.

The Soviets were eager to avoid the

isolation that tensions with both East and West would insure.
Despite Khrushchev's enthusiasm, the visit to America and
the talks with President Eisenhower brought no progress on the
Berlin situation.

Nor did subsequent talks with President

Kennedy at the Vienna Summit in June 1961 achieve results.
Almost immediately after returning from Vienna, Khrushchev
dropped his efforts at cooperation by announcing a December
deadline for a four-power settlement on Berlin.
The new ultimatum would be in vain, however.

In February

of that year US Defense Secretary McNamara had held a press
briefing to dispel the notion that the Soviets held an ICBMbased strategic advantage over the United States.

The Soviets

had failed to demonstrate any shift in their favor of the
balance of power.
thousands

of

In addition to the continued deployment of

tactical

nuclear

weapons,

the

Kennedy

41Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without
War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington:
The Brookings Institution, 1978), 365.
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administration answered the Soviet challenge by requesting and
receiving a three billion dollar military appropriation from
Congress

in

order to

expand

conventional

forces.42

The

purpose of the increased spending was to make credible the
American threat of a military response to Soviet demands and
to create a greater range of strategic options.43 The threat
worked,

as

the

Soviets

realized

that

the

United

States

considered war a real possibility and might actually choose
war,

conventional or nuclear,

Berlin Crisis.44

as a tenable option in the

The American willingness to consider armed

conflict called Khrushchev's bluff.
their

four-power

settlement

on

The Soviets didn't gain
Berlin.

On

August

12

4

barricades were erected between East and West Berlin, soon to
be replaced by the more permanent Berlin Wall.

With the

failure of his desperate attempt the following year to regain
the

strategic

initiative

by

installing

IRBMs

in

Cuba,

Khrushchev's tenure was finished.
Khrushchev's attempt to use Berlin to exert leverage
against the West had fared no better than Stalin's.

The

Soviets were faced with an ill-afforded acceleration of the
42Horelick and Rush, 124.
43The United States' original postwar doctrine to counter
Soviet aggression was that of "massive retaliation," taking
advantage of America's nuclear superiority. The development
of conventional force alternatives to allow strategic
bombardment was prescribed by the Kennedy administration's new
doctrine of "flexible response."
44Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1991), 217-18.
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arms race.
insured

Their aggressive political and military stance

that

indefinitely.

the

Americans

would

remain

in

Europe

Finally, the division of Germany was accepted

by both the US and the USSR as a given feature of the postwar
world.

The division had not received legitimate recognition

by either side, but each would base its foreign policy on the
pragmatic acceptance of two German states.

Ill
CONSOLIDATING SOVIET HEGEMONY, 1961 TO 1968

Even during the Second Berlin Crisis, a Soviet strategy
for decoupling the Federal Republic from the West based on
cooperation with

Bonn

developed.

Despite

the

political

situation during the Crisis, trade between the Soviet Union
and West Germany had increased considerably.45

During his

last years, Khrushchev began opening to Bonn not merely for
the economic benefits of trade with the more prosperous FRG
but also for the political purpose of loosening the ties
between Bonn and Washington.46
The Soviet perceptions on West German-American relations
were varied,

but the opinion that the two countries were

drifting apart was gaining strength in the USSR.
1960s

change

in

US

military

strategy

from

The early
"massive

retaliation" to "flexible response" strained relations with
West Germany.

While the Americans believed that this change

enhanced the credibility of deterrence, the Germans feared the
switch demonstrated the US desire for a flexible diplomacy
that would not necessarily require Washington to support
45Stent, From Embargo to Ostoolitik. 79.
46Sodaro, 52.
26

27

German interests.47
tolerance

of

"Flexible response" could mean American

limited

Soviet

aggression

in Europe.

The

perceived decline in US superiority in nuclear capabilities
further undermined the credibility of the American nuclear
commitment.48
The pipeline embargo of 1962-63 provided the Soviets with
another example of the potential divisibility of the West.

By

the early 1960s the Soviets had concluded deals with the
Federal

Republic and other West European

states

for the

purchase of large-diameter steel pipe for the construction of
pipelines.

The American decision to impose a NATO embargo on

pipe sales to the Soviet Union came during the tense period
shortly after the Cuban missile crisis.
reasons for the decision.

There were three

First, the US believed that the

Soviets were dumping oil on the world market.

The cheaper

prices threatened to create a West European dependency on less
expensive Soviet oil.

Second, the US government wished to

prevent the construction of the Friendship Pipeline, which
would help supply Eastern Europe with Soviet oil.

This

pipeline could also be used to supply Soviet troops in Europe.
Finally,

the

embargo

would

serve

to

assert

American

predominance on matters of East-West trade.49
47Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany. America. Europe:
Years of German Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT:
University Press, 1989), 72.
48Ibid. , 13.
49Stent, From Embargo to Ostpolitik. 103.
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The embargo failed, however, to assert any US dominance
on East-West trade policies? it did divide NATO members.
embargo was not observed by Britain.

The

Italy continued to

fulfill earlier contracts with the Soviets.

West Germany

honored the US decision, but German firms strongly opposed the
German

governments

decision.50

The

pipeline

embargo

succeeded in reaffirming Soviet belief in the "contradictions"
present within the Western alliance.
Believing that such disputes could be exploited to Soviet
advantage, Khrushchev initiated more extensive contacts with
West Germany.
of

In July 1963 he sent his son-in-law, and editor

Izvestiva. Aleksei Adzhubei

to the

FRG as

a

special

emissary in order to express Soviet willingness to improve
political and economic relations between the two countries.51
Two months later Khrushchev received an invitation to meet
with Chancellor Erhard.

The visit never took place, however.

In October, the Soviet leader was forced to resign.
The Brezhnev-Kosygin regime that followed took a more
cautious position with respect to German-Soviet rapprochement.
The cooperative trend begun during Khrushchev's last years was
halted.

The impetus for change would come this time not from

Soviet foreign policy, but from West German Ostpolitik.
In 1966 the Grand Coalition of the Christian Democrats
and Social Democrats was formed.
50Ibid., 112.
51Sodaro, 61.

Willy Brandt's appointment

29

as foreign minister marked the rise of the SPD in the Federal
Republic.

The SPD was considerably more flexible in its

policies regarding Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.52
The Kiesinger-Brandt government announced its intentions to
pursue diplomatic relations with the Eastern European states
(excluding the GDR).
The Soviet reaction to the Grand Coalition overtures was
restrained.

Brezhnev was conservative in his foreign policy.

He was concerned that the more advanced West German economy
would prove attractive to the Eastern bloc and might thus
provide Bonn with greater political
Europe.53

influence

in Eastern

The greater West German influence would threaten

Soviet control of its satellites.

Brezhnev's concern seemed

well-founded

abandoned

as

Czechoslovakia

the

hard-line

position toward the FRG, turning to Bonn for economic aid.54
The

reform

movement

in

Czechoslovakia

threatened

Soviet

communist ideology and thus implied that Prague wanted some
measure of independence.

For Moscow,

the changes in its

Eastern bloc satellite seemed to challenge Soviet authority.
In addition to straying from orthodox Soviet Communism, the
reform movement threatened Soviet control of Czechoslovak
lands that were crucial to the Soviet forward-based strategy
against NATO.
52Stent, From Embargo to Ostoolitik. 132.
53Wolfe, 316.
54Sodaro, 113.
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The result was the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.
The reform movement was stamped out, and Bonn received a clear
signal that the Soviet Union was unwilling to allow its East
European states to pursue relations independently with the
West.

Such independent endeavors could weaken the cohesion of

the Eastern bloc.55
At the same time,

however,

the invasion gave Moscow

confidence in its ability to deal with threats to Soviet
dominance in Eastern Europe.56 The United States had offered
only verbal opposition to the invasion; American reluctance to
take

a

stronger

encouraged Moscow.

stand

against

Soviet

the

intervention

Brezhnev had succeeded in consolidating

Soviet hegemony in the East bloc, and the outcome would be a
change in Soviet policy toward the West.

Although Moscow

would maintain its imposing military posture in Europe, it had
gained a sense of security that allowed it to pursue detente
with its Western adversaries.

55Hanrieder, 192.
56Sodaro, 109.

IV
DETENTE, 1968 TO 1979

Whereas Brezhnev1s policy throughout much of the late
1960s continued efforts at weakening the FRG's ties to the
West,

especially the United States,

the Soviet government

relaxed these efforts after the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
The growing Sino-Soviet conflict motivated this change in
part; the conflict had erupted in open clashes along the
Ussuri River in March 1969 and Moscow wished to prevent any
US-Chinese rapprochement that could isolate the USSR.
Another
technology

motivation

was

the

and access Western

need

credit

to

import

in order to

declining growth rates in the Soviet economy.57

Western
offset

Since the

removal of Khrushchev, Moscow had increased its buildup of
nuclear and conventional forces in order to create a greater
range of military options and to improve its strategic posture
with respect to the United States.58

The buildup strained

the Soviet economy which lagged behind Western economies in

57Adomeit, 203.
58Wolfe, 428.
31
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nonmilitary technology.59
The Soviet stance toward NATO also shifted.

Whereas the

July 1966 Bucharest proposal had expressed the Soviet bloc's
desire for a European security system that dissolved NATO, the
March 1969 Budapest proposal accepted the participation of
NATO in security arrangements.60

The Soviets realized that

the polarization of Europe into East and West reinforced the
status quo; bipolarity strengthened stability in Europe.
Despite Ulbricht's fears of economic dependence on the
West and warnings of political dependency, Moscow's strategy
during the early 1970s was to seek detente with the West in
order to pursue economic relations.

Western contact could

help supply Soviet domestic needs for technology and consumer
goods.

Economic ties with the West would help secure detente

by giving both blocs a vested interest in maintaining the
peace.

Economic contacts with Eastern Europe would enhance

the political legitimacy of the status quo.61

The Soviet

mistake in economic policy during this period was relying on
external

economic

contact

rather than promoting

internal

59Conservative
CIA
estimates
of
Soviet
military
expenditures as a share of GNP for these years placed defense
spending at 11-13%. Some estimates placed the percentage even
higher. See, for example, Franklyn D. Holzman, "Politics and
Guesswork:
CIA and DIA Estimates of Soviet Military
Spending," International Security 14 (Fall 1989): 106-07.
60Hanrieder, 201.
61Bruce Parrott, "Soviet Foreign Policy, International
Politics and Trade with the West," in Trade. Technology and
Soviet-American Relations, ed. Bruce Parrott (Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1985), 36.
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reform.

Ironically,

Ulbricht's

warnings

of

economic

dependency were to prove well-founded, but Ulbricht himself
would be replaced in May 1971 by Erich Honecker.
Brezhnev's cooperative phase ushered in the first period
of true detente during the Cold War.
two notable accomplishments.

The year 1970 witnessed

The first was the signing in

August of the German-Soviet Treaty renouncing the use of
force.

The Federal Republic declared its intention to regard

all borders in Europe as inviolable.

This accorded an all but

diplomatic recognition of the status quo from West Germany.
The treaty was a conciliatory gesture between the USSR and the
FRG, and afterwards Bonn was able to turn to Eastern Europe
with Soviet acquiescence.62
The second achievement of detente was the signing in
September of the Quadripartite Agreement

on Berlin.

In

another exchange of conciliatory gestures, West Germany agreed
not to conduct constitutional business in West Berlin, and the
Soviets guaranteed the right of West Germans to travel to West
Berlin and visit East Germany.63
Whether through a perceived advantage in the "correlation
of forces" or simply through overconfidence inspired by the
more favorable conditions with respect to the West, the Soviet
Union was guilty of serious miscalculations during this time
of detente.

Warmer relations with the West deluded Moscow

62Hanrieder, 203.
63Ibid., 206.
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into thinking that Western Europe no longer felt threatened by
Soviet military might.64

Moscow's willingness to explore

detente did not extend to the reduction of military forces.
The

Soviets

had

established

control

of

Eastern

Europe,

maintained leverage against the West and intervened with some
success in the Third World by building up their military
might.

The Soviets believed they could continue to strengthen

their forces in Europe without alarming the West.

Even during

the 1970s thaw in East-West relations, the Soviet Union was
unwilling to withdraw its forces from Eastern Europe.

While

such an action might facilitate the^ Soviet goal of reducing
the American presence in Europe, it might result in a loss of
Soviet control over Eastern Europe.65 Brezhnev's cooperative
strategy,

thus

far

successful

in

establishing

improved

relations with the West, would ultimately be undermined by his
continued reliance on military might.

His greatest mistake

would be his failure to take advantage of warmer relations
with the West to ease the military strain on the Soviet
economy.

This failure would severely limit Soviet strategy in

the 1980s, when a collapsed economy would force the Soviets to
redefine their concept of security.

64Sodaro, 232.
65Ibid., 201.

V
THE DECLINE OF DETENTE AND COLD WAR II, 1977 TO 1985

Detente did not halt Soviet efforts to take advantage of
American-West

European

"contradictions.”

There were

two

contrasting policies of how best to exploit differences in the
Western camp, both of which were utilized.

One advocated

relaxing tensions between East and West? the other favored
confronting NATO and the United States.66
were, of course, contradictory.

These approaches

Whatever success the Soviets

could achieve by promoting economic contact between the two
blocs and by using the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe to settle disputes was undermined by their rigid
military posture that polarized Europe into its two alliances.
The Soviet pursuit of contradictory policies would begin the
decay of detente.
Moscow's willingness to work through the CSCE process was
based on the unilateral benefits the process provided for the
Soviet Union.

Western participation in CSCE implied Western

acceptance of the European status quo.

Through CSCE the

Soviets could insinuate that, while the Soviet Union was part
of Europe and therefore had a legitimate voice in determining
66Sodaro, 198.
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security arrangements, the United States was not.

Finally,

Soviet participation in the conference promoted Moscow's peace
initiative to divide the West on matters of military strategy
and to distract the West

from the continued Soviet arms

buildup.67
The Soviets erred in this last point.

The West was

extremely concerned about the arms buildup, especially the
modernized SS-20 missiles.

Moscow's efforts to divide NATO by

confronting it not only undermined the peace initiative, they
served to unite the NATO members in opposition to the Soviet
military stance.

The Soviets had thought that the FRG in

particular was ready to dissent from NATO policy.

German

skepticism about the American nuclear deterrent had seemingly
indicated Bonn's desire to take a course independent of the
United States.
Again, however, West Germany thwarted Soviet plans.

In

an October 1977 speech in London, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt
warned that the Soviets had achieved a significant advantage
in tactical nuclear capabilities with the modernized SS-20s
and the new intermediate-range Backfire bomber.

Schmidt

called for a restoration of the military balance in Europe in
order to maintain the political balance, fearing that Soviet
Eurostrategic superiority would give them political leverage
over the West.68
67Van Oudenaren, 60, and Clemens, 157.
68Hanrieder, 109-12.
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Schmidt's concerns were shared throughout the alliance.
On December 12, 1979 NATO ministers voted to restore the
strategic balance by deploying Pershing II and ground-launched
cruise missiles in Europe.
Soviet

surprise,

supported

The Federal Republic, much to
this

decision.69

US-Soviet

relations would further deteriorate at the end of that month
when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, unofficially marking the
start of Cold War II.
The sharp deterioration that marred relations between
Moscow and Washington did not extend to the European capitals,
however.

The Soviet government wished to maintain viable

relations in order to avoid international isolation.70
was especially true with respect to Bonn.
not

"punish"

the

FRG

for

its

This

The Soviets could

involvement with

the

NATO

deployment decision because Moscow relied heavily on trade
with West Germany to sustain its failing economy.71 Thus the
Soviet Union had developed an economic dependency on the West
that limited its foreign policy responses.
Maintaining warmer relations with Europe also suggested
additional chances for exploiting contradictions and reducing
American influence.

In response to the 1979 Afghanistan

invasion and the 1981 imposition of martial law in Poland, the

69Van Oudenaren, 9-10.
70Sodaro, 273.
71Ibid. , 274-75.
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Reagan

administration

imposed

another

pipeline

embargo.72

This embargo was to hinder the construction of a natural gas
pipeline reaching from the Urengoi peninsula in Siberia to
Western Europe.

The Soviet Union had concluded deals for the

pipeline with the FRG, Great Britain, France and Italy? none
of these states complied with the sanctions.

The United

States rescinded its decision in November 1982.

Once again

the Soviets perceived a large potential fissure among NATO
members.
Despite the Reagan administration's late reversal on the
embargo, the association between the superpowers continued to
sour in the early 1980s.

In March 1983 Reagan unveiled the

SDI program, threatening to carry the arms race to new heights
at the very moment when the Soviets had finally been forced to
come to grips with the economic and political costs of their
vast buildup.

The Soviets

sought to manipulate Western

popular opinion against NATO's nuclear policies and to exploit
anti-nuclear fears, especially in the Federal Republic.

In

November following the SDI announcement, the Soviets walked
out of the INF negotiations.
Brezhnev had died in November 1982,
legacy of economic stagnation.
internal economic reform.

leaving behind a

The Soviets had neglected

The continued expansion of military

72Angela Stent, "East-West Relations and the Western
Alliance," in Trade. Technology and Soviet-American Relations,
,
ed. Bruce Parrott (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
1985), 305.
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forces drained resources needed for nonmilitary development.
As conditions between the United States and the Soviet
Union worsened, the Soviets struggled with a succession crisis
aggravated by the untimely deaths of both Yuri Andropov and
Konstantin Chernenko.
Gorbachev would
strategy

in

alternatives.

This would be the situation Mikhail

inherit in 1985.

Europe

would

limit

Forty years of Soviet
his

foreign

policy

Strategies varying between confrontation and

cooperation had failed to reach postwar objectives, trade with
the West had not overcome economic backwardness,
detente of the 1970s had eroded.

and the

VI
GORBACHEV AND GERMAN REUNIFICATION, 1985 TO 1990

The history of Soviet postwar policy revealed the limited
success of various strategies concerning Germany and the West
before 1985.

The Soviets had failed to prevent the Federal

Republic's entry into NATO and the subsequent rearmament of
West German territory.

Using Berlin as a lever had failed to

prevent German integration into the Western alliance.

The

Soviet Union had been similarly unable to use Berlin to
demonstrate the change of the strategic balance in favor of
Moscow.

The Soviets did not establish regional military

superiority as they had hoped to do; American nuclear forces
still undermined the Soviet geostrategic and conventional
force advantage.

Peace initiatives had not succeeded in

dividing the West, either by creating disputes among NATO
members

or

by

arousing

government practices.

Western

popular

opinion

against

Economic discord had been visible

within the Western alliance, but Moscow had been unable to
convert this to military advantage.

More broadly, the Soviet

Union had been unable to establish any European security
system that excluded its nemesis, the United States.
importantly,

the

Soviets

had
40

not

achieved

Most

economic

41

independence from the West and had failed to overcome their
technological

backwardness

and

economic

weakness

through

trade.
Gorbachev's "new thinking" is best understood against the
background of forty years of frustrated Soviet strategy.
thinking,"

spurred

by

economic

need

as

much

as

"New

defense

considerations, reevaluated the view of security held by the
Soviet Union since World War II.73

Whereas the traditional

Soviet view had favored heavy military-industrial investment
to prepare for conflict with the West, Gorbachev's reforms
called for greater participation in the international economy,
less military spending and avoiding conflict with the West.74
Gorbachev

realized that the Soviet

emphasis

on the arms

buildup had sorely taxed the domestic resources of the Soviet
Union and had not improved the Soviet position worldwide.
Moscow still faced a united NATO, expensive and unrewarding
efforts at intervention in the Third World, and the threat of
another acceleration of the arms race with the United States.
The Soviet Union could no longer afford to pursue security in
terms of unilateral advantage; it had to seek mutual security
with the United States and its European allies.
Initially Gorbachev's foreign policy tactics did not
73Stephen M. Meyer, "The Sources and Prospects of
Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security," International
Security 13 (Fall 1988): 125.
74Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution:
A Waning of
Soviet Expansionism?" International Security 9 (Winter 198485): 115.
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deviate significantly from those of his predecessors.

"New

thinking" was in part a new variation on an old strategy, one
that sought to advance a new peace initiative in order to turn
popular

opinion

practices.75

in

the

West

against

Western

military

In January 1987 Gorbachev announced a proposal

to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2000.

Such an

idea was not new to Kremlin leaders; denuclearization would
revalue
advantage

the

Soviet

and

geographic

decouple

the

US

and

conventional

and

Western

forces

Europe

by

eliminating the American nuclear commitment that bound these
entities together.76

The renewed Soviet military advantage

would guarantee an increase in Soviet influence in Europe.
Politically,

if NATO were to resist Moscow's

denuclearization,

efforts

at

the Soviets could gather sympathy among

popular anti-nuclear groups and put NATO into "an awkward
political situation.1177
In this sense, the 1987 Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear
Forces was a Soviet gain.

Eliminating intermediate forces

meant that NATO's nuclear weapons could no longer strike the
Soviet Union from European territory.

The Soviets, hoping to

arouse popular opinion against Western military practices,
could then argue that NATO had abandoned weapons that could
75Gerhard Wettig, "Gorbachev and 'New Thinking' in the
Kremlin's Foreign Policy," Aussenoolitik 38, no. 2 (1987):
150.
76Jof fe, 109-10.
77Wettig, "Deterrence, Missiles and NATO," 325.
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strike the Soviet Union but had retained those capable of
inflicting

mass

especially

in

destruction
Germany.78

in

the

European

Militarily,

the

theater,

INF

Treaty

partially undermined the doctrine of flexible response because
it eliminated the range of possible nuclear responses between
battlefield and strategic weapons.

Politically, it loosened

the nuclear ties that bound the Western alliance together,
since it abolished the intermediate forces that had served
throughout the Cold War as part of the deterrent against
Soviet aggression against Europe.79
Yet Gorbachev's version of the peace initiative could not
offset the need for Soviet internal reform.

In the mid-1980s

the main strategic concern of the Soviet government was the
cost of military expenditures and acceleration of the arms
race threatened by SDI.
resources

on

The Soviets needed to spend their

economic modernization

rather than military

competition.80
Realizing that Soviet military challenges during the
postwar period had only provoked the West, Gorbachev declined
to provoke it further.
traditional enemy.

Instead he sought to deny the West its

In February 1988 Moscow announced its

willingness to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan.

The

78Wettig, "Deterrence, Missiles and NATO," 330.
79Lewis A. Dunn, "NATO After Global 'Double
Survival 30, no. 3 (May-June 1988): 197-98.
80Sodaro, 323.
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following May Gorbachev announced that the military doctrine
of the Warsaw Pact relied on the minimum amount of strength
needed

for

defense

rather

than

regional

superiority.81

Following the Soviet ratification of the INF Treaty in May
1988,

numerous criticisms of past Soviet military policy

appeared in the USSR.82

These argued that the search for

nuclear parity with the United States had been a costly and
vain endeavor, because parity was ". . . virtually useless
militarily,

counterproductive

economically.

.

.

.1,83

politically

Soviet

vital

and

exhausting

interests

were

threatened not from the outside, as once feared, but from
inefficient internal structures.

"[T]he security of a country

depends primarily on an efficient economy and on internal
social

and

political

stability.1,84

The

Soviet

military

buildup had prevented Moscow from reducing its involvement in
international conflicts,
putting an excessive strain on our economy, handicapping
our diplomatic flexibility . . . and holding up the
progress of Soviet initiatives aimed at forming a
comprehensive system of international security.85
Realizing the necessity of economic cooperation with the West
81Ibid., 330, citing "Document on the Military Doctrine
of the Warsaw Pact States," in Pravda (30 May 1987): 1-2.
82Ibid., 331.
83Nikolai Spassky,
"National Security:
Real
Illusory," International Affairs (Moscow), (July 1989):

and
6.

84Rubanov, 3-4.
85Alexei Arbatov, "How Much Defense Is Sufficient?"
International Affairs (Moscow), (April 1989): 33.
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in order for perestroika to succeed at home,
established

formal

relations

Community in June 1988.86

with

the

the Soviets

European

Economic

At the 28th Congress of the CPSU

in July 1990, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze stated:
Our country has no future outside of integration into the
overall
world
system of economic
and
financial
institutions and ties.
We must emerge from the self
isolation from the world and from progress into which we
have driven ourselves.87
As the Soviets reexamined their foreign policy, the 1989
uprisings in Eastern Europe began.

In the German Democratic

Republic, a mass exodus from the country started during the
summer.

Finding no Soviet support for his continued hard-line

policies, Erich Honecker resigned on October 18.

On November

9 Berlin's Brandenburg Gate opened; East German police merely
watched

as hundreds

Berlin.

Speculation about reunification began in Eastern and

Western capitals.

of East

Berliners

crossed

into West

It was particular significant that these

events were occurring in Germany.

As Shevardnadze would soon

acknowledge in the "two plus four" talks in Bonn:
In the postwar years, the entire structure of military
and political confrontation, everything that we connect
with the cold war period, has been bound up with Germany
as a geographic concept.
Consequently, we are not
discussing Germany alone? we are not solving German

86Sodaro, 343.
87"Report by E. A. Shevardnadze, Member of the Politburo
of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Foreign
Affairs," Pravda, 5 July 1989, 2, quoted in Current Digest of
the Soviet Press 42 (22 August 1989): 13.
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problems alone. . . .88
Moscow was faced with the possibility of losing the GDR, and
losing it to the Western alliance.

Its westernmost military

ally, its pillar of ideological control over Eastern Europe
and its political bargaining lever against the West,

was

escaping Soviet control.
Gorbachev had two options:

to intervene militarily and

reestablish order in the GDR, or to allow events to continue.
Intervention would threaten Soviet-West German relations,
possibly alienating the Soviets from Europe's future economic
superpower and Moscow's political and economic door to the
West.89

It would also antagonize NATO, prompting a renewal

of tensions between East and West.
article

speculated

on

the

A July 1990 Izvestia

repercussions

of

military

intervention:
The result?
The GDR would be a new pressure cooker,
threatening to explode at any minute. The USSR would be
isolated in all directions, not just from the West.
Instead of disarmament, there would be new NATO military
programs, to which we would once more have to provide an
"appropriate response," draining the country's already
skimpy resources.
An oppressive situation in Europe,
fraught with conflicts. A sizable extra burden tacked
onto our domestic problems.90

88"Speech by E. A. Shevardnadze," Izvestia, 6 May 1990,
3, quoted in Current Digest of the Soviet Press 42 (6 June
1990): 10.
89Karl Kaiser, "Germany's Unification," Foreign Affairs
70, no. 1 (America and the World 1990-91): 191-92.
90S. Guk, "USSR—FRG Dialogue:
Who Made the Most
Concessions?" Izvestia. 18 July 1990, 1, quoted in Current
Digest of the Soviet Press 42 (22 August 1990): 7.

47

On the other hand, Soviet acquiescence to the seemingly
inevitable reunification process could continue Moscow's peace
initiative.

The Soviet policy of disarmament and acquiescence

might be more influential to the European populace than NATO's
policy of deterrence.91

Furthermore, if the revolutions in

Eastern Europe were to result in the disintegration of the
Warsaw Pact, the presence of at least one functioning military
alliance in Europe would better safeguard stability— a united
Germany in NATO was better than a powerful and independent
Germany occupying the center of a disorganized Europe.92
Faced therefore with two choices,

one

of which was

clearly discredited by past Soviet experience with the West,
Gorbachev took the one viable option.

At a press conference

in Zhiliznovdsk on 16 July 1990, the Soviet leader consented
to a united Germany in NATO.

91Habakkuk, 261.
92Gerhard Wettig,
"German Unification and
Security," Aussenoolitik 42, no. 1 (1991): 14.
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CONCLUSION

Gorbachev's radical departures from traditional Soviet
policy during the late 1980s must be examined in light of the
entire period of Soviet policy after World War II.

The forty

years preceding him had narrowed foreign policy options so
that Moscow's only feasible reaction to the events of 1989 was
to acquiesce to the loss of Eastern Europe and especially to
the loss of the German Democratic Republic.
Soviet strategies had been unable to achieve their goals
concerning Germany.

The Kremlin had wished to insure that

Germany would never again be a threat to the Soviet Union.
West German rearmament through NATO, especially with tactical
nuclear weapons, placed the Western threat at the very edge of
the East bloc.

The Soviets could not prevent the FRG from

undermining their control of Eastern Europe.

West Germany

provided an enviable example of the prosperity of the Western
capitalist nations.

Its absorption of East Germany took away

the ideological pillar the GDR had provided the East bloc.
The loss of East Germany guaranteed that the Soviet Union
could never again regain control of Eastern Europe.

Finally,

Moscow had been unsuccessful in its efforts to decouple the
FRG from the Western alliance.
48

No controversy between Bonn
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and Washington proved divisive enough to split the ties that
bound the two together.

The Soviets had not merely failed to

detach West Germany from the United States and its allies—
reunification meant the Soviets had lost the GDR to NATO as
well.
Soviet strategies concerning Europe met with similar
frustration.

Moscow could not maintain its territorial gains

from the War, and Washington denied it the political gain of
superpower recognition.
Europe

proved

The attempted buffer zone in Eastern

equally untenable.

The

Soviet

geographic

advantage that the region should have provided was negated by
American nuclear weapons.

Finally, militant policies toward

the West threatened to isolate the Soviets.

Cooperative

attempts at foreign policy before Gorbachev were inevitably
undermined

by

the

challenging military

posture.

Soviet

attempts to take by force what could not be won through
diplomacy always met with a firmly united Western front.
The Soviet government had disastrously neglected economic
reform.

Placing economic parity with the West second to

nuclear parity created a dangerous dependency on economic
cooperation

with

the

FRG

and

other Western

states

that

gradually reduced Soviet ability to apply military leverage
against these nations.

Every confrontation with the United

States threatened another acceleration of the arms race that
the Soviet Union could ill-afford.
Economic stagnation at home and a narrowed range of
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policy options abroad forced the Gorbachev government to
reexamine

and

redefine

the

Soviet

concept

of

security.

Competing in the arms race and sustaining massive troop and
weapon forces in Europe proved too expensive.

Security in the

traditional sense, meaning regional superiority in order to
survive and win a war, eluded the Soviets.
alarmed and provoked the West.

The guest for it

Gorbachev realized that one

cannot seek security at another's expense.

Faced with the

inescapable collapse of the Soviet empire, he chose to accept
the breakup of the old world order rather than attempting to
suppress it with Soviet might.

Nowhere is this more clearly

demonstrated than in Gorbachev's acquiescence to a united
Germany remaining in NATO.

In accepting reunification on such

terms, Gorbachev has perhaps achieved what his predecessors
have never done.

He has won more trust among the Western

nations than any other Soviet leader.
united Europe,

He has made possible a

one in which Soviet influence may someday

exceed any previous level.

He has forced NATO to redefine its

objectives, and containing the Soviet Union is now no longer
one of them.

Americans themselves are now questioning to what

extent should the US presence in Europe be continued.
Unfortunately for Gorbachev, the breakup of the Soviet
empire has extended to the Soviet Union itself.

For Moscow to

enjoy its newfound improved standing with the West, it will
have to secure its standing among the Soviet republics.

It is
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indeed ironic that the end of the Cold War has brought about
a unified Germany and a divided Soviet Union.
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